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Abstract This paper proposes a trustworthiness model for the design of secure
learning assessment in on-line web collaborative learning groups. Although com-
puter supported collaborative learning has been widely adopted in many educa-
tional institutions over the last decade, there exist still drawbacks which limit
their potential in collaborative learning activities. Among these limitations, we in-
vestigate information security requirements in on-line assessment, (e-assessment),
which can be developed in collaborative learning contexts. Despite information se-
curity enhancements have been developed in recent years, to the best of our knowl-
edge, integrated and holistic security models have not been completely carried out
yet. Even when security advanced methodologies and technologies are deployed
in learning management systems, too many types of vulnerabilities still remain
opened and unsolved. Therefore, new models such as trustworthiness approaches
can overcome these lacks and support e-assessment requirements for e-Learning.
To this end, a holistic security model is designed, implemented and evaluated in
a real context of e-Learning. Implications of this study are remarked for secure
assessment in on-line collaborative learning through effective trustworthiness ap-
proaches.
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2 Jorge Miguel et al.
1 Introduction
Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning (CSCL) has been widely adopted
in many educational institutions over the last decade. Among these institutions,
the Open University of Catalonia1 (UOC) develops on-line education based on
continuous evaluation and collaborative activities.
Although on-line assessments (e-assessments) in both continuous evaluation
and collaborative learning have been widely adopted in many educational insti-
tutions over the last years, there exist still drawbacks which limit their potential.
Among these limitations, we investigate information security requirements in as-
sessments which may be developed in on-line collaborative learning contexts.
Despite information security technological enhances have also been developed
in recent years, to the best of our knowledge, integrated and holistic security
models have not been completely carried out yet. Even when security advanced
methodologies and technologies are deployed in Learning Management Systems
(LMS), too many lacks still remain opened and unsolved. Therefore, as new models
are needed, in this paper we propose a trustworthiness approach based on hybrid
evaluation which can complete these lacks and support e-assessments requirements.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the background about se-
curity in e-Learning as well as our research already done with respect to trustwor-
thiness and security in e-assessment. Section 3 reviews the main factors, classifi-
cation and security issues involved in security in e-assessments and we discussed
that security improvements in e-assessments cannot be reached with technology
alone; to fill this drawback, in Section 4, we extend our security model with the
study of the trustworthiness dimension. Once studied trustworthiness factors and
rules and presented our previous work, in Section 5 we describe a model based on
trustworthiness applied to e-assessments. In Section 6, we conduct our research to
peer-to-peer e-assessment developed in a real on-line course and by developing a
statistical and evaluation analysis for the course collected data. Finally, Section 7
concludes the paper highlighting the main ideas discussed and outlining ongoing
and future work.
2 Security in e-Learning Background
Since 1998, information security in e-Learning has been considered as an important
factor in e-Learning design. Early research works about these topics [7] are focused
on confidentiality and these privacy approaches can be found in [13]. Despite the
relevance of privacy requirements in secure e-Learning, information security does
not serve for privacy services only. Indeed, in many works [6,23], security in e-
Learning has been treated following more complex analysis and design models.
In [23] the author argues that security is an important issue in the context
of education. Security is mainly an organizational and management issue and im-
proving security is an ongoing process in e-Learning. This proposal is the first
1 The Open University of Catalonia is located in Barcelona, Spain. The UOC offers distance
education through the Internet since 1994. Currently, about 60,000 students and 3,700 lectur-
ers are involved in over 8,300 on-line classrooms from about 100 graduate, post-graduate
and doctorate programs in a wide range of academic disciplines. The UOC is found at
http://www.uoc.edu
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Security in Online Web Learning Assessment 3
approach in which information security is applied to LMS as a general key in e-
Learning design and management. Furthermore, in [6] it is presented how security
in e-Learning can be analyzed from a different point of view, that is, instead of
designing security, the author investigates threats for e-Learning and then, several
recommendations are introduced and discussed in order to avoid detected threats.
On the other hand, more specific security issues in secure e-Learning have been
investigated (e.g. virtual assignments and exams, security monitoring, authentica-
tion and authorization services). These works have been summarized in [10–13].
So far we have discussed on the security design in e-Learning from a theoret-
ical point of view. However, some authors argue we actually need to understand
attacks in order to discover those relevant security design factors and figure out
how security services must be designed [5]. Researchers have already conducted
many efforts proposing taxonomies of security attacks. In [24], through analyzing
existing research in attack classification, a new attack taxonomy is constructed
by classifying attacks into dimensions. This paper also offers a complete a com-
plete and useful study examining existing proposals. Nevertheless, since attacks
taxonomies might be applied to cover each kind of attack, which might occur in
LMS, they are not closely related to security design in e-Learning. In order to fill
this gap, in [13], we have proposed an alternative approach which associate attacks
to security design factors.
We now extend the background about security in e-Learning by analyzing real-
life security attacks and vulnerabilities, which could allow attackers to violate the
security in a real context. In this sense, several reports are found, which justify
the relevance of security attacks during the last two years. In particular, the study
presented in [2] uncovered that security attacks are a reality for most organizations:
81% of respondents’ organizations experienced a security event (i.e. an adverse
event that threatens some aspect of security). Finally, we can consider specific LMS
real software vulnerabilities. Moodle is an Open Source LMS which is massively
deployed in many schools and universities. In Moodle Security Announcements 2,
40 serious vulnerabilities have been reported in 2013.
In previous research [10–13] we have argued that general security approaches
do not provide the necessary security services to guarantee that all supported
learning processes are developed in a reliable way. The rest of this section presents
our work already done and our research results obtained at the time of this writing
regarding analysis and security design in CSCL, trustworthiness and e-assessment
and a trustworthiness methodology proposal.
We have investigated how to enhance CSCL security in terms of security anal-
ysis and design. To this end, we have analysed security properties models, how to
model students’ interaction and trustworthiness, and how security properties and
students’ interaction are involved in CSCL activities. These goals and research
results are summarized in the following list:
– Security requirements in CSCL. In [11] it is argued that current e-Learning
systems supporting on-line collaborative learning do not sufficiently meet es-
sential security requirements and this limitation can have a strong influence in
the collaborative learning processes.
– Design of secure CSCL systems. In [10] the problems caused in collaborative
learning processes by the lack of security are discussed and the main guidelines
2 https://moodle.org/mod/forum/view.php?f=996
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4 Jorge Miguel et al.
for the design of secure CSCL systems are proposed to guide developers to
incorporate security as an essential requirement into the collaborative learning
process.
– Security requirements in mobile learning. In [12] it is presented an overview of
secure LMSs, inspecting which are the most relevant factors to consider, and
connecting this approach to specific aspects for mobile collaborative learning.
Then, real-life experience in security attacks in mobile learning are reported
showing a practical perspective of the learning management system vulnera-
bilities. From this experience and considerations, the main guidelines for the
design of security solutions applied to improve mobile collaborative learning
are proposed.
– Security requirements in MOOCs. In [13] it is investigated the lack of provision
of IS to MOOC, with regards to anomalous user authentication, which cannot
verify the actual students identity to meet grading requirements as well as
satisfy accrediting institutions. In order to overcome this issue, it is proposed
a global user authentication model called MOOC-SIA.
Once security and CSCL issues have been analysed, we have focused our re-
search work on trustworthiness analysis and data processing based on trustwor-
thiness modelling in order to define trustworthiness modelling concepts (i.e. tech-
niques and measures). The aim is to build normalization methods and propose
parallel processing techniques to speed and scale up the structuring and process-
ing of basic data. These objectives are related to the design of secure learning
objects, trustworthiness assessment and prediction, and the development of pilots
for validation processes. This work has produced the following research results:
– Trustworthiness model. In [15] a trustworthiness model for the design of secure
learning assessment in on-line collaborative learning groups is proposed. To this
end, a trustworthiness model is designed in order to conduct the guidelines of
a holistic security model for on-line collaborative learning through effective
trustworthiness approaches.
– Parallel processing approach. In [14] it is proposed a trustworthiness-based ap-
proach for the design of secure learning activities in on-line learning groups. The
guidelines of a holistic security model in on-line collaborative learning through
an effective trustworthiness approach are presented. As the main contribution
of this paper, a parallel processing approach, which can considerably decrease
the time of data processing, is proposed thus allowing for building relevant
trustworthiness models to support learning activities even in real-time.
– Trustworthiness normalization methods. In [19] an approach to enhance infor-
mation security in on-line assessment based on a normalized trustworthiness
model is presented. In this paper, it is justified why trustworthiness normal-
ization is needed and a normalized trustworthiness model is proposed by re-
viewing existing normalization procedures for trustworthy values applied to e-
assessments. Eventually, the potential of the normalized trustworthiness model
is evaluated in a real CSCL course.
– Trustworthiness prediction. In [18] previous trustworthiness models are en-
dowed with prediction features by composing trustworthiness modelling and as-
sessment, normalization methods, history sequences, and neural network-based
approaches. In order to validate our approach, a peer-to-peer e-assessment
model is presented and carried out in a real on-line course.
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Security in Online Web Learning Assessment 5
The next phase of our research on security in e-Learning based on trustworthi-
ness has been focused on building a trustworthiness methodology offering a guide-
line for the design and management of secure CSCL activities based on trustwor-
thiness assessment and prediction to detect security events and evidences. In [17]
the need of trustworthiness models as a functional requirement devoted to improve
information security is justified. A methodological approach to modelling trust-
worthiness in on-line collaborative learning were proposed. This proposal aims at
building a theoretical approach to provide e-Learning designers and managers with
guidelines for incorporating security into on-line collaborative activities through
trustworthiness assessment and prediction.
Finally, we have endowed our trustworthiness approaches with the concept of
students’ profile and collective intelligence features. In [16] we have discovered how
security can be enhanced with trustworthiness in an on-line collaborative learning
scenario through the study of the collective intelligence processes that occur on on-
line assessment activities. To this end, a peer-to-peer public students profile model,
based on trustworthiness is proposed, and the main collective intelligence processes
involved in the collaborative on-line assessments activities were presented.
To sum up, the present paper contribute to existing security solutions models
by providing an innovative approach for modelling trustworthiness in a real con-
text of secure learning assessment in on-line collaborative learning groups. The
study shows the need to combine technological security solutions and functional
trustworthiness measures.
3 Secure e-Assessment
In this section, we present a review of the main factors, classification and security
issues involved in security in e-assessments. Firstly, security properties related to e-
assessments are evaluated by examining and selecting most relevant ones. Then, an
assessments classification is depicted in order to analyse how e-assessments types
and factors are related to previously selected security properties and. Finally, we
propose a security model which extends technological security techniques adding
functional requirements to secure e-assessments.
3.1 Authenticity in e-Assessments
In order to determine whether or not an e-assessment is secure, both from students’
as evaluators’ point of view, it can be inquired if the e-assessment satisfies the
following properties:
– Availability. The e-assessment is available to be performed by the student at
the scheduled time and during the time period which has been established.
After the assessment task, the tutor should be able to access the results to
proceed to review the task.
– Integrity. The description of the e-assessment (statement of the activity, etc.)
must not be changed, destroyed, or lost in an unauthorized or accidental man-
ner. The result delivered by the student must achieve the integrity property
too.
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6 Jorge Miguel et al.
– Identification and authentication. While performing the evaluation task, the
fact that students are who they claim to be must be verifiable in a reliable
way. In addition, both students’ outcomes and evaluation results must actually
correspond to the activity that students have performed.
– Confidentiality and access control. Students will only be able to access to e-
assessments that have been specifically prepared to them and tutors will access
following the established evaluation process.
– Non repudiation. The LMS must provide protection against false denial of
involvement in e-assessments.
Due to the difficulty of provisioning a complete secure e-assessment including all
of these properties, a first approach of secure e-assessments selects a subset of
properties which can be considered as critical in evaluation context. The selected
properties are identification and integrity. Integrity must be considered both as
authorship as well as data integrity. Therefore, we will be able to trust an e-
assessment process when identification and integrity properties are accomplished.
In the context of e-assessments, with regarding to identification, students are who
they claim to be when they are performing the evaluation activities (e.g. access to
the statement in a test, answering a question in an interview with the evaluator,
etc.). In addition, dealing with integrity and authorship, we trust the outcomes of
the evaluation process (i.e. a student submits evaluation results) when the stunted
is actually the author and these elements have not been modified in an unautho-
rized way. It is important to note that e-assessments are developed in a LMS and,
since the LMS is an information system, two different items are involved in this
context: processes and contents which are related to integrity and identification.
Therefore, services applied to e-assessment must be considered in both a static
and a dynamic way.
3.2 Assessments Classification
The scope of our research, with regarding to assessment, is the evaluation model
used in UOC courses. Evaluation models used in UOC may be classified in accor-
dance with the following factors or dimensions: (i) type of subjects; (ii) specific
evaluation model; (iii) evaluation application; (iv) agents involved in the evaluation
processes. Fig. 1 shows factors and evaluation types.
Firstly, we have to analyse the agents who are involved in evaluations processes.
The agents selected are students, tutors and the LMS, that is, students carrying
out learning activities in a LMS which are assessed by tutors. In this context,
we consider two types of subjects in UOC courses, a standard subject has many
students in the virtual classroom and the level of collaborative learning activities
is low. On the other hand, a collaborative subject is designed following a intensive
collaborative learning model which is performed by few students arranged in learn-
ing groups. Regarding these evaluation models, two different models are selected,
the continuous evaluation model allows the tutors to assess the students through-
out the course by evaluating each activity in the subject; in contrast, a evaluation
model based on final exams focuses the evaluation processes on an assessment
instrument at the end of the course.
Once the subject, evaluation and agent dimension are presented, we focus the
analysis on evaluation applications. In manual evaluation methods, tutors usu-
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Subjects 
Standard (many 
students) 
Collaborative (few 
students) 
Evaluation 
Model 
Continuous 
Final exams 
Evaluation 
Application 
Automatic 
Manual 
Hybrid 
Agents 
Student 
Tutor 
LMS 
Interaction Level 
Identity and Integrity Levels 
Fig. 1 Evaluation types
ally participate directly and intensely in the evaluation process. This model has
scalability problems but can provide better guarantees for students’ identification
and authorship because the degree of interaction between tutors and students is
higher than in others evaluation methods. Although this statement may be true
in general cases, it may not apply to all situations, that is, the interaction level
does not necessarily mean that students’ identification is authentic (as defined
above: data integrity and authorship). On the other hand, automatic methods do
not involve tutors participation (or minimal), but this model does not carry out
desirable identification and integrity levels. Finally, hybrid methods are a trade-off
combination which can provide a balance between the degree of interaction and
security requirements. In Fig. 1 it has been marked those elements which are in-
volved in the model proposed. In the following sections, the secure e-assessment
model is presented.
3.3 Technological Approaches
According to [4] problems encountered in ensuring modern computing systems
cannot be solved with technology alone. In order to probe this statement and
to justify that it is needed to extend technological models with trustworthiness
functional proposals, in this section, we are going to present a use case that illus-
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
8 Jorge Miguel et al.
trate how Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) does not completely guarantee security
requirements. The example use case is defined as follows:
The e-assessment is an e-exam with most common characteristics of virtual
exams. For further information, in [8] it is discussed how unethical conduct during
e-Learning exam taking may occur and it is proposed an approach that suggests
practical solutions based on technological and biometrics user authentication.
The e-exam is synchronous and students have to access the LMS to take the
description of the e-exam at the same time. The exam, which presents a list of
tasks to be solved by the student. The statement is the same for all students
who perform the e-exam and then, each student performs her work into a digital
document with her own resources. When the student’s work is finished, outcomes
are delivered to the LMS before the deadline required.
Once defined this use case, we can improve security requirements using PKI
based solutions, in concrete terms, digital certificates to guarantee students’ iden-
tification and digital signature for outcomes integrity and authorship. Therefore,
the process described above is adapted to this way:
– The student accesses the LMS identified by its digital certificate. Similarly, the
LMS presents its digital certificate to the student.
– Since both LMS and student have been identified in a trust process, the student
receives the description of the e-exam and begins her work.
– The student checks the built-in digital signature statement in order to validate
the integrity of this element.
– When the student finishes her work in the outcomes document, the student
performs the operation of digital signature (into the digital document and
using her digital certificate).
– Eventually, the student’s signed document will be delivered in the LMS, ac-
cording to the procedure defined in the first step.
At this point we can formulate the question: can we trust this model? In other
words, are those processes and elements involved in the e-exam bearing integrity
and identification properties? As stated at the beginning of this section, ensuring
modern computing systems cannot be solved with technology alone. Therefore, we
should be able to find vulnerabilities in this technological security proposal. For
instance, although the identification process based on the certificate public key
(even signed and issued by a certification authority) is only able to be made by
the holder of the private key (the student), we do not know if this certificate is
being used by the student who we expect or if the student has sent this resource
to another one. Although we can add additional technological measures such as
certificate storage devices, there are ways to export these keys or have remote
access to manage them. Therefore, we can conclude that the student may share
their resources identification and signature.
4 Trustworthiness Approaches for Secure e-Assessment
In the previous section we discussed that security improvements in e-assessments
cannot be reached with technology alone. To fill this drawback that impedes e-
assessments to deploy their potential, we review in this section trustworthiness
approaches to design secure e-assessment.
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4.1 Trustworthiness and Security Related Work
In [22] it is discussed that security is both a feeling and a reality. The author
points out that the reality of security is mathematical based on the probability
of different risks and the effectiveness of different countermeasures. In addition,
security is a feeling based not on probabilities and mathematical calculations, but
on our psychological reactions to both risks and countermeasures. Since this model
considers two dimensions in security and being aware that absolute security does
not exist (see Section 3.3) any gain in security always involves a trade-off between
technological and functional approaches. This approach is very relevant in the
context of hybrid evaluation systems in which technological and trustworthiness
solutions can be combined. This trade-off is proposed because, as it is concluded
by the author, we need both to be and to feel secure.
Our approach providing security to e-assessments extends technological solu-
tions and combines these services with trustworthiness models. In this context, it
is also important to consider additional trustworthiness related work, even when
the scope of trustworthiness models is not closely related to security in e-Learning.
Next, we continue our related work study taking general trustworthiness references.
4.2 Trustworthiness Factors
Beyond the overview of security and trustworthiness presented, we need to review
how trustworthiness can be measured and which are the factors involved in its
quantitative study. In [3] a data provenance trust model is proposed, which takes
into account factors that may affect the trustworthiness. Based on these factors,
the model assigns trust scores to both data and data providers.
In our context, students and students’ resources (e.g. a document, a post in a
forum, etc.) can be modelled following this approach. Moreover, factors that may
affect trustworthiness when students are developing collaborative learning activi-
ties must be discovered. To this end in [1], the author designs a survey to explore
interpersonal trust in work groups identifying trust-building behaviours ranked
in order of importance. We use these behaviours as trustworthiness factors which
can measure trustworthiness in those activities that students develop in collabo-
rative activities. The factors considered to model trustworthiness when students
are performing collaborative activities are summarized in Table 1.
4.3 Trustworthiness Rules and Characteristics
Trustworthiness levels may be represented as a combination of trustworthiness fac-
tors. Moreover, according to [9] there are different aspects of consideration of trust
and different expressions and classifications of trust characteristics. In essence, we
can summarize these aspects defining the following rules: (i) Asymmetry, A trust
B is not equal to B trust A; (ii) Time factor, trustworthiness is dynamic and may
evolve over the time; (iii) Limited transitivity, if A trusts C who trusts B then A
will also trust B, but with the transition goes on, trust will not absolutely reliable;
(iv) Context sensitive, when context changes, trust relationship might change too.
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Table 1 Trustworthiness Factors
N Factors and Description
Trustworthiness Building Factors (TBF)
Student S working in the group of students GS
is building trustworthiness when...
1 S communicates honestly, without distorting any information.
2 S shows confidence in GS’s abilities.
3 S keeps promises and commitments.
4 S listens to and values what GS say, even though S might not agree.
5 S cooperates with GS and looks for mutual help.
Trustworthiness Reducing Factors (TRF)
Student S working in the group of students GS
is reducing trustworthiness when...
1 S acts more concerned about own welfare than anything else.
2 S sends mixed messages so that GS never know where S stands.
3 S avoids taking responsibility.
4 S jumps to conclusions without checking the facts first.
5 S makes excuses or blames others when things do not work out.
The model presented in this paper is designed taking into account factors
and rules which have been presented in this section. Furthermore, we define two
additional concepts (trustworthiness levels and indicators) which are presented in
the following sections.
4.4 Evidences and Signs
Trustworthiness factors are defined from the perspective of students’ behaviours
and, on the other hand, technological solutions cannot solve security requirements
alone; in consequence, it is necessary to note that all methods discussed provide
security improvements but do not completely ensure e-assessments requirements.
Furthermore, neither trustworthiness nor PKI models define or manage the actions
to take when the security service detects either anomalous situations or violation
of the properties we have defined. Firstly we must consider that according to this
fact we have to distinguish between evidences and signs. Evidence is defined as
information generated by the security system in a reliable way and the evidence
allows us to state that a certain security property has been violated. For exam-
ple, if a process of electronic signature is wrong, we can state that the signed
document does not meet the integrity property and this is an irrefutable fact re-
garding to mathematical properties of public and private keys involved in digital
signature. On the other hand, signs allow us to assign a trustworthiness level to a
system action or result. These levels are based on probabilities and mathematical
calculations, in other words, potential anomalous situations are associated with
probabilities.
For each type of anomalous situations detected (i.e. evidences and signs) it is
necessary to define different measures. Measures which can be taken are presented
below:
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– Active. We act directly on the e-assessments processes. For instance, if a evi-
dence is detected, the security service will deny access to the student and the
student cannot continue with the next tasks.
– Passive. Analysis and audit. Focused on analysing the information provided
by the security system without acting on the e-assessment. They may generate
further actions, but the process continues as planned before the fault detection.
5 A Trustworthiness Model
In this section, we propose a trustworthiness model for security based on the
previous elements and issues. Firstly, we identify those instruments and tools which
will collect trustworthiness data. Then, a statistical analysis based on a model of
trustworthiness levels is presented.
5.1 Research Instruments and Data Gathering
Four research instruments are considered to collect users’ data for trustworthiness
purposes and feed our model:
– Ratings. Qualifications of objects in relation to assessments, that is, objects
which can be rated or qualified by students in the LMS.
– Questionnaires. Instruments which allow us to both collect trustworthiness
students’ information and to discover general aspects design in our model.
– Students’ reports. Assessment instrument containing questions and ratings per-
formed by the students and reviewed by the tutors.
– LMS usage indicators. To collect students’ general activity in LMS (e.g. number
of documents created).
All of these research instruments are quantitative and they have been designed
to collect mainly trustworthiness levels and indicators as well as assessment infor-
mation. In order to manage trustworthiness data, we define the concept of trust-
worthiness Data Source (DS) as those data generated by the research instrument
that we use to define trustworthiness levels which are presented in the following
section.
5.2 Modelling Trustworthiness Levels, Indicators and Rules
We introduce now the concept of trustworthiness indicator twi (with i ∈ I, where
I is the set of trustworthiness indicators) as a measure of trustworthiness factors.
Trustworthiness factors have been presented (see Section 4.2) as those behaviours
that reduce or build trustworthiness in a collaborative group and they have been
considered in the design of questionnaires. For instance, a trustworthiness indicator
measuring the number of messages in a forum is related to the TBF-5 (the student
cooperates and looks for mutual help). Therefore, an indicator twi is associated
with one of the measures defined in each e-assessment instrument (i.e. ratings,
questionnaires, reports, etc.). Moreover, we introduce the concept of trustwor-
thiness level Ltwi as a composition of indicators over trustworthiness rules and
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characteristics. For instance, we can consider two trustworthiness indicators (twa
and twb). These indicators are different, the first indicator could be a rating in a
forum post and the second one could be a question in a questionnaire; but they
measure the same trustworthiness building factor (e.g. TBF-1: communicates hon-
estly, described in Table 1). Finally, trustworthiness rules R, may be compared to
the group, over the time or considering the context. Considering all the above,
trustworthiness indicators can be represented following these expressions:
twar,s , a ∈ {Q,RP,LGI} , r ∈ R, s ∈ S (1)
where Q is the set of responses in Questionnaires, RP is the analogous set in
Reports, LGI is the set of LMS indicators for each student (i.e. ratings and the
general students’ data in the LMS). S is the set of students in the group and
R is the set of rules and characteristics (e.g. time factor). These indicators are
described above when presenting research instruments.
Once trustworthiness indicators have been selected, trustworthiness levels can
be expressed as follows:
Ltwi =
n∑
i=1
twi
n
, i ∈ I (2)
where I is the set of trustworthiness indicators which are combined in the trust-
worthiness level Ltwi.
Trustworthiness levels Ltwi must be normalized. To this end, we have reviewed
the normalization approach defined in [21] with regarding to support those cases
in which particular components need to be emphasized more than the others.
Following this approach, we previously need to define the weights vectors:
w = (w1, . . . , wi, . . . , wn) ,
n∑
i
wi = 1 (3)
where n is the total number of trustworthiness indicators and wi is the weight
assigned to twi. Then, we define trustworthiness normalized levels as:
LtwNi =
n∑
i=1
(twi · wi)
n
, i ∈ I (4)
To sum up, our trustworthiness approach allows us to model students’ trustworthi-
ness as a combination of normalized indicators using research and data gathering
instruments. Regarding groups, this model may also be applied in cases with only
one working group; in this scenario, all students would belong to the same group.
5.3 Statistical Analysis
Following the trustworthiness model presented we need to inquire whether the
variables involved in the model are correlated or not. With this purpose the corre-
lation coefficient may be useful. Some authors have proposed several methods with
regarding to rates of similarity, correlation or dependence between two variables
[20]. Even though the scope of [20] is focused on user-based collaborative filtering
and user-to-user similarity, the models and measures of the correlations between
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two items applied in this context are fully applicable in our scope. More precisely,
we propose Pearson correlation coefficient (represented by the letter r) as a suit-
able measure devoted to conduct our trustworthiness model. Pearson coefficient
applied to a target trustworthiness indicator is defined bellow:
ra,b =
∑n
i=1
(
twa,i − twa
) (
twb,i − twb
)√∑n
i=1
(
twa,i − twn
)2
.
√∑n
i=1
(
twb,i − twb
)2 (5)
where twa is the target trustworthiness indicator, twb is the second trustworthi-
ness indicator in which twa is compared (i.e. similarity, correlation, anomalous
behaviour, etc.), twa and twb are the average of the trustworthiness indicators
and n is the number of student’s provided data for twa and twb indicators.
It is important to note that if both a and b are trustworthiness indicators
which have several values over the time (e.g. a question which appears in each
questionnaire), they must be compared at the same point of time. In other words,
it is implicit that ra,b is actually representing rat,bt where at is the trustworthiness
indicator in time t.
In addition, this test may be applied to every trustworthiness indicator taking
one of them as target indicator. To this end, we define the general Pearson coeffi-
cient applied to a target trustworthiness indicator over the whole set of indicators
is defined as follows:
ra,t = (ra,1, . . . , ra,i, . . . , ra,n−1) , i ∈ I, i 6= a (6)
where ra,i is the Pearson coefficient applied to a target trustworthiness indicator
is defined above and I is the set of trustworthiness indicators.
Both relation and similarity are represented by ra,b and rA grouping students’
responses and taking the variables at the same time. We are also interested in
time factor and it may be relevant the evolution of trustworthiness indicators
throughout the course. To this end, we extend previous measures, adding time
factor variable:
ra,t,tt =
∑n
i=1
(
twat,i − twat
) (
twatt,i − twatt
)√∑n
i=1
(
twat,i − twat
)2
.
√∑n
i=1
(
twatt,i − twatt
)2 (7)
where t is the target point in time and tt is the reference point in time (i.e. t is
compared against tt), all other variables have already been defined with this case
they are instanced in two moments in the course.
Similarly, we can calculate ra,t,tt for each tt, and then the following indicator
may be used:
ra,t = (ra,1, . . . , ra,i, . . . , ra,n−1) , i ∈ I, i 6= a (8)
Trustworthiness indicators which have already been presented in this section are
summarized in Table 2.
Since hybrid methods are considered as a suitable trade-off approach for the
model, we can combine these indicators with results of manual continuous eval-
uation results made by the tutor. For instance, a coefficient applied to target
trustworthiness indicator a is compared to a manual continuous evaluation, that
is:
ra,b = cvt (9)
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Table 2 Trustworthiness Basic Indicators
Indicators Description Group by Target/Reference
r(a,b) Pearson coefficient applied to a target
trustworthiness indicator.
Students twa and twb
ra r(a,b) over the set of indicators Indicators twa
r(a,t,tt) Pearson coefficient applied to a tw indica-
tor throughout the course from t to tt
Time twa and t
r(a,t) r(a,t,tt) over the throughout the course. Course twa
where the second indicator b is exchanged by the value in continuous evalua-
tion. According to this indicator, we can analyse the similarity between manuals
and automatics results. Furthermore, each Pearson interpretation which has been
presented until now, may be applied to continuous evaluations parameters, for
instance: r(a, t, tt) where a = cvt.
On the other hand, as aforementioned in the case of questionnaires, some ques-
tions, which evaluate the same trustworthiness factor, are proposed in two different
ways: individual and group evaluation. Hence, students are asked about some fac-
tors related to every member in her work group and then about the group in
general. In this case, we can also compare these values using Pearson correlation.
Finally, trustworthiness indicators may be gathered in a trustworthiness matrix
with the aim of representing the whole relationship table for each indicator:
Rtw =

0 rtw1,tw2 · · · · · · rtw1,twn
0 0 rtw2,tw3 · · · rtw2,twn
...
...
. . .
. . .
...
...
...
. . . rtwn−1,twn
0 0 · · · · · · 0

(10)
Indicators which have been presented in this section are studied in the analysis
stage of the model. Although they are proposed as suitable options, the model
is refined to select those indicators oriented to perform the best similarity and
correlation evaluation model. In addition, this approach is also intended to be a
prediction tool, that is, similarity facts may conduct to carry out predictions about
the evaluation system and its evolution.
6 Analysis of Results and Evaluation
As discussed in the section 2 with respect to trustworthiness models and bearing
in mind the abstract model presented in the section 5, there exist considerable
variation regarding goals, contexts, and scopes in trustworthiness approaches. In
this section, we conduct our evaluation method on peer-to-peer e-assessment de-
veloped in a real on-line course. Our peer-to-peer e-assessment model is based on a
collaborative assessment component and, in this section, we also present the design
and implementation of the component including research instruments and tech-
nological tools. Finally, we conclude the section with important issues concerning
processing trustworthiness levels and indicators as well as statistical analysis and
interpretation.
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6.1 Real On-line Course Features
We have carried out several studies [15,17,18] in our real context of e-Learning of
the UOC during the Spring academic term of 2014, with the aim to experiment
with specific trustworthiness and security approaches devoted to evaluate the fea-
sibility of our trustworthiness models, tools, and methodologies. In this paper, we
build and deploy our comprehensive e-assessment methodology in the real on-line
course presented in [15,17,18], whose key features can be summarized as follows:
– Students’ e-assessment was based on a manual continuous e-assessment model
by using several manual e-assessment instruments.
– Manual e-assessment was complemented with automatic methods, which rep-
resented up to 20 percent of the total students overall grade.
– Taking into account below features, we implemented a hybrid e-assessment
method by combining manual and automatic e-assessment methods, and the
model allows us to compare results in both cases.
– 59 students performed a subjective peer-to-peer e-assessment, that is, each
student was able to assess the rest of class peers in terms of knowledge acquired
and participation in the class assignments.
– The course followed seven stages which were taken as time references in trust-
worthiness analysis. These time references allow us to compare trustworthiness
evolution as well as to carry out e-assessment methods.
– Each stage corresponded to a module of the course, which had a learning
component (i.e. book) that the student should have studied before developing
the assessment activities of the course.
From the above methodology, we have designed the peer-to-peer e-assessment com-
ponent which is presented in the next section.
6.2 Continuous Assessment Component
As aforementioned in Section 3.1, we used a subset of security properties for e-
assessment security modelling, hence integrity and identification were selected as
target security properties for the continuous assessment component. Following
these security properties and after the analysis of potential students’ interactions
in peer-to-peer assessment activities as well as the peer-to-peer assessment possi-
bilities, the first version of the continuous assessment component was proposed in
[18,17].
The Continuous Assessment (CA) component is formed by the following three
assessment activities and procedures [18]:
1. Once the student has studied a module (M), she receives an invitation to answer
a set of three questions about the current module; this is the first activity of
the CA named the Module Questionnaire and denoted by Q.
2. The student does not have to answer as soon as Q is sent, because the second
activity of the CA is a students’ forum (F) intended to create a collaborative
framework devoted to enhance responses in activity Q, in other words, Q and
F activities are concurrent tasks.
3. The final activity is the core of the peer-to-peer assessment and the student
has to complete a survey (P) which contains the set of responses from Q. The
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student has to assess each classmates’ responses in Q and, furthermore, the
activity of each student in the forum F is assessed. The scale used to assess
both forum participation and students’ responses is (A, B, C+, C-, D, and N
for no answer).
The formulation of the algorithm corresponding to the e-assessment process of the
CA was presented in [18] (see Alg. 1 and also [17]).
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for the e-assessment process [18]
Require: M {the list of modules} and S {the set of students in the course}
1: for m: M do
2: Qm ← create questionnaire(m)
3: send(Qm, S)
4: Fm ← create forum(m)
5: F (m)← class discussion(Fm, S)
6: Q(m)← getResponses(Qm, S)
7: Pm ← create p2p eval(Q(m), S)
8: send(Pm)
9: P (m)← getResponses(Pm, S)
10: e assessment(m)[]← results(Q,F, P, S)
11: end for
12: return e assessment(m)[]
6.3 Research Instruments and Technological Tools
For the purpose of the CA implementation and deployment, a questionnaire cre-
ation function has been developed (i.e. create questionnaire). Due to the output
of the first questionnaire (see variable Q(m) in the algorithm) is the input to the
peer-to-peer assessment activity (i.e. variable Pm), we can automate the assess-
ment process for each CA. These function has been implemented as a Java class
named CreateP2P, which includes the set of attributes and methods required to
automatically generate the assessment activity Pm. The automation capabilities of
the process are actually focused on the set of responses and the survey Pm manual
customizations such as the text or the invitation messages.
The CA uses two survey web applications. The module questionnaire (Q) is im-
plemented in Google Forms3 and the peer-to-peer questionnaire (P) with LimeSur-
vey4. Due to the data exchange requirements between the two survey tools, we have
selected the Coma Separate Values (CSV) format as the data exchange model. For
this reason and with the aim of simplifying the implementation process we have in-
tegrated in our Java components the package Super CSV5 which offers advanced
CVS features dealing with reading and writing advanced operations on lists of
strings.
We have selected LimeSurvey because a high configurable export and import
survey functions based on standard formats are needed. After the evaluation of sev-
eral survey formats, we have selected the CSV option. The function create p2p eval
3 http://www.google.com/drive/apps.html
4 http://www.limesurvey.org
5 http://supercsv.sourceforge.net/index.html
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has been implemented by the Java class create p2p csv, which receives a CSV re-
sponses file containing the set of responses collected by Google Forms and creates
a LimeSurvey CVS survey format by converting the responses in questions for the
new peer-to-peer questionnaire. The hosting support for LimeSurvey framework
has been provided by the RDlab6.
Moreover, because of the peer-to-peer and dynamic features of the question-
naire P, we need to extract assessment results in primitive and normalized e-
assessment data format as presented in the following section. To this end, we have
developed the Java class Results.
Finally, dealing with processing the Pearson correlation coefficient, we have
used the statistical analysis program GNU PSPP7.
6.4 Trustworthiness Data Sources, Levels and Indicators
Before the statistical analysis phase, we define trustworthiness data sources, indi-
cators and levels in the context of our CA. We have defined a trustworthiness data
source as those data generated by the CA that we use to define trustworthiness
features presented in Section 4. Each CA (i.e. one CA per module) will manage
four data sources. The first is related to the students’ responses count and can be
denoted with the following ordered tuple:
DSQC = (M,Q, S, count) (11)
where the questionnaire data source is defined as the total number of responses
(count) that each student in S has answered in the questionnaire Q for the module
M .
The second data source also refers to the students’ responses and the DS offers
each specific response:
DSQR = (M,Q, S, res) (12)
where the questionnaire data source DSQR is defined as the response res (i.e. a
student answers res to a question) that each student in S has responded regarding
a specific question in Q in the module M .
The third data source refers to the participation degree in a forum. These data
sources can be denoted with the following ordered tuple:
DSF = (M,F, S, count) (13)
where the forum data source DSF is defined as the total number of posts (count)
that each student in S has sent to a forum F regarding a specific question in Q in
the module M .
Finally, we introduce a score data source as follows:
DSR = (M,Q, S, SS, score) (14)
where the responses data source denotes the score that a student (in S) has assessed
a student’s (in SS) response of a question in Q. Hence, S is the set of students who
assess and SS is the set of students who are assessed by students in S. Although
6 http://rdlab.lsi.upc.edu
7 http://www.gnu.org/software/pspp/
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S and SS may be considered as the same set of students in certain applications,
they are actually considered as different sets because we permit participation in
the second stage of the activity even when the student has not carried out the first
one.
Tuples in DSR are stored in a relational database table, namely MySQL
8.
Once trustworthiness data sources have been defined we define three trustwor-
thiness levels. Following the model defined in Section 5.3, we first combine the
trustworthiness indicators of each question in the module, and then the overall
trustworthiness level for the student in a specific module is defined:
LR,m,s =
n∑
i=1
(twi · wi)
n
, i ∈ Q,w = (wi = wj) ,m ∈M (15)
where LR,m,s is the trustworthiness level for the student s in the module m
measured by the trustworthiness indicator twi which considers the responses for
each question in Q.
LF,m,s = twF,m,m ∈M (16)
where twF,m is the trustworthiness indicator for the responses in the collabo-
rative forum F for the module m.
Lmis =
n∑
i=1
Ltwi · wi
n
, i ∈ {LR,m, LF,m}, w = (wi = wj) ,m ∈M (17)
where Lmis is the overall trustworthiness level for the student s in the module
m, calculated by combining the trustworthiness level for responses LR,m,s and the
trustworthiness level for forum participation LF,m,s.
6.5 Statistical Analysis and Interpretation
Here we analyse the trustworthiness levels and indicators presented in the previous
section. The graph presented in Fig. 2 shows the overall LR,m,s for each student
and for each module. It is worth mentioning that students who had not participated
in any CA activity have been omitted. In this graph the LR,m,s level for each
student has been accumulated by module, hence as shown in Fig. 2 those students
who did not participate in all the activities proposed, they were considered in the
study.
Regarding students’ participation, we have monitored participation values (see
Fig. 3) revealing a decrease of participation level after considering the following
information:
– Q: Questionnaire participation.
– F: Total number of post in the forum.
– FP: Participation in the forum.
– P: Peer-to-peer survey participation.
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Fig. 2 LR,m,s level for each student and module
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Fig. 3 Students’ participation evolution
In contrast to the decrease in the participation level, with respect to the evolu-
tion of the overall scores in the course, these values are steady along all the modules
in the course. The overall scores evolution are shown in Fig. 4, which presents the
overall score result for each module activity, that is, LR,m,s and LF,m,s without
considering each specific student’s values and detailing each questions for LR,m,s
(i.e. Q1, Q2 and Q3).
We have calculated the correlation coefficient between the values in the point
of time 1 to 7 (i.e. each module). The results of the correlation analysis are shown
in Fig. 5. Pearson’s correlation is close to 1 for most of the cases, hence there
is a strong relationship between trustworthiness levels in modules. The observed
correlation is positive; consequently, when the trustworthiness level increases in
module i, trustworthiness level in module i+x also increases in value. The sig. value
8 http://www.mysql.com/
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Fig. 4 Overall scores in the course
  M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 
M1 Pearson Correlation 1,00 ,70 ,64 ,54 ,59 ,54 ,63 
 Sig. (2-tailed)  ,00 ,00 ,01 ,01 ,02 ,03 
 N 40 26 22 20 20 18 12 
M2 Pearson Correlation ,70 1,00 ,89 ,81 ,86 ,81 ,69 
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,00  ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,02 
 N 26 26 20 18 19 16 11 
M3 Pearson Correlation ,64 ,89 1,00 ,83 ,76 ,80 ,79 
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,00 ,00  ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00 
 N 22 20 23 19 18 16 12 
M4 Pearson Correlation ,54 ,81 ,83 1,00 ,78 ,76 ,80 
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,01 ,00 ,00  ,00 ,00 ,00 
 N 20 18 19 20 16 15 11 
M5 Pearson Correlation ,59 ,86 ,76 ,78 1,00 ,75 ,90 
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,01 ,00 ,00 ,00  ,00 ,00 
 N 20 19 18 16 21 16 11 
M6 Pearson Correlation ,54 ,81 ,80 ,76 ,75 1,00 ,86 
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,02 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00  ,00 
 N 18 16 16 15 16 18 12 
M7 Pearson Correlation ,63 ,69 ,79 ,80 ,90 ,86 1,00 
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,03 ,02 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,00  
 N 12 11 12 11 11 12 12 
 
Fig. 5 SPSS Pearson coefficient between trustworthiness levels in modules
is less than 0.05, because of this, hence we can conclude that there is a statistically
significant correlation between trustworthiness levels. Note that in Fig. 5 we have
marked those values which correspond to correlation between consecutive module
(i.e. rmi,mi+1), in these cases, the coefficient is always more than 0.7.
Finally, in order to compare manual an automatic assessment results, a fore-
most step is needed. We organized both manual and peer-to-peer activities in a
timeline diagram with the aim to compare manual and automatic activities in
suitable time references. To this end, we have designed a course plan that permits
the comparison process between manual and peer-to-peer assessment. The manual
assessment activities are taken as time reference.
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Fig. 6 Dispersion chart
Once the time references have been defined, we can compare overall values
between manual and automatics method. For instance, Fig. 6 shows the dispersion
chart between the automatic peer-to-peer activity for the module 1 (i.e. R1) and
the first manual assessment method. It can be seen from the function in Fig. 6
that there exist anomalous cases detected with respect to the difference between
the manual and the automatic value. The rest of the values follow a significant
relation between these parameters.
6.6 Findings
In this section we summarize the most relevant findings that emerge from the
results and the statistical analysis.
The participation level has experimented a marked decrease along the course,
especially at the end of e-assessment activities. We plan to tackle this problem
with alternative course schedule with the aim to balance the students’ peer-to-
peer activities and other students’ assignments.
Regarding overall peer-to-peer (i.e. automatic) and continuous (i.e. manual)
assessment overall levels, the results reveal a notable difference between the overall
range of these values. Fig. 6 shows that most of peer-to-peer assessment values are
in the range from 3,5 to 4,3 (the e-assessment scale was from 1 to 5) and the
continuous assessment, from 1 to 9.
Although the model has to be enhanced and we have to solve the aforemen-
tioned problems, the statistical analysis shows significant findings regarding the
feasibility of the hybrid evaluation method. The results of the comparisons between
manual and automatic assessment indicate (also see Fig. 6):
– The mean difference between manual and automatic method is 0,81 (the scale
used from 0 to 10).
– The maximum and minimum difference: 0,03 and 2,82.
– The percentage of assessment cases in which the difference between manual
and automatic assessment is less than 1 (i.e. 10% with respect the maximum
score) is the 76,92%.
– If we extend the difference to more than 2 points in the scale, the percentage
of assessment cases in this range is the 92,31%.
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The most significant finding is related to anomalous user assessment. From
these data, 3 students whose deviation is greater than 20% were found anomalous
and required further investigation for potential cheating in order to validate the
authenticity (i.e. identification and integrity) of her learning processes and results.
7 Conclusions and Further Work
In this paper we have presented an innovative approach for modelling trustworthi-
ness in the context of secure learning assessment in on-line collaborative learning
groups. The study shows the need to propose a hybrid assessment model which
combines technological security solutions and functional trustworthiness measures.
To this end, a holistic security model is designed, implemented and evaluated in
a real context of e-Learning. This approach is based on trustworthiness factors,
indicators and levels, which allow us to discover how trustworthiness evolves into
the learning system.
As ongoing work, we plan to continue the methodology testing and evalu-
ation by deploying e-assessment learning components in additional real on-line
courses. Due to further deployments will require large amount of data analysis, we
will continue investigating parallel processing methods to manage trustworthiness
factors and indicators by improving the MapReduce [14] configuration strategies
that would result in improvement of a parallel speed-up, such as customized size
of partitions. Moreover, we plan to evaluate and test trustworthiness predictions
methods. With respect to prediction, we would like to improve our approach in
order to predict both trustworthiness students’ behaviour and evaluation alerts
such as anomalous results. To this end, we plan to evaluate neural networks and
data mining models by designing a methodological approach to construct a trust-
worthiness normalized model. In addition, in our future work, we would like to
improve our students’ public profile model in real on-line courses.
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